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The fallowing article is excerpted from "Information, Institutions, and Extortion in Japan and
the United States: Making Sense of Sokaiya Racketeers," which will appear in its complete form
in 93 Northwestern University Law Review this summer. Publication is by permission.

How do legal, regulatory, and organizational systems affect the
emergence and development of corporate extortion? The
question arises whether the extortionist is a potential plaintiff
seeking settlement, a labor union threatening to strike, or the
lucky finder of the mouse-in-the-soda-bottle of urban legend. In
each case, including those in which extortion may be lawful and
even desirable, the extortionist's threat and the corporation's
response depend on the institutional context in which the
extortion takes place.
In the Japanese system, corporate extortion by sokaiya gangsterracketeers appears to be widespread. Although sokaiya (literally,
"general meeting operators") take several forms, a sokaiya
typically is defined as a nominal shareholder who either attempts
to extort money from a company by threatening to disrupt its
annual shareholders' meeting or works for a company to suppress
opposition at the meeting. Surprisingly, Japanese executives pay
sokaiya despite the fact that payment can result in civil and
criminal liability not only for sokaiya, but for the executive as well.

Recent scandals involving some of
Japans largest and most prestigious
financial institutions have thrust sokaiya
into international headlines and vividly
illustrate some of the problems of the
Japanese and/or Asian economic systems. In
spring 1997, prosecutors revealed that DaiIchi Kangyo Bank (DKB), the fifth-largest
corporation in the world, had paid sokaiya
Ryuichi Koike a total of $96 million for his
services. Koike then admitted that he used
these funds to acquire a stake significantly, for exactly the number of
shares needed to give him the right to make
proposals at shareholders' meetings - in
each of Japans "Big Four" securities
brokerages. The brokerages subsequently
paid Koike a combined total of nearly $6
million to keep their meetings quiet. The
"Koike scandal" led to mass board
resignations, to the arrest of 35 executives,
to the suicide of a former DKB chairman,
and ultimately to the dissolution of
Yamaichi Securities and the collapse of the
Japanese stock market. Six months later,
eight executives of Hitachi, Toshiba, and
three Mitsubishi group companies were
arrested (and as of this writing, all but one
have been convicted) for paying sokaiya
amounts ranging from $16,800 to $72,000
- ostensibly for the use of a beach house to keep their meetings quiet. Fewer than six
months after that, prosecutors revealed that
the exorbitant brochure-advertising fees that
certain Mitsubishi group companies had
paid a former flight attendant were actually
disguised payments to her husband, a 30year sokaiya veteran, to keep meetings
quiet. In August 1998, two extortionists
were arrested for leasing office plants (at
prices to make a florist blush) to Japan
Airlines in exchange for meeting protection,
and Toyota and Nissan soon admitted that
they had done the same.
These recent incidents appear to be part
of a much larger phenomenon. Since
criminal penalties were clearly imposed on
payments to sokaiya in 1982, executives of
31 corporations - almost all of which are
household names in Japan, and only one of
which is not listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange - have been convicted of
making payments to sokaiya. In a 1997
survey of large Japanese firms including
giants such as NTT, Toyota, and Matsushita,
nearly 90 percent indicated that they had
been approached by sokaiya with
extortionist demands of one kind or
another. Another recent survey of 2,000
firms (1,200 responding) found that 77
percent had paid sokaiya. This generous
corporate support is said to keep in
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Estimates of how much money companies actually pay sokaiya vary. One study
finds that typical sokaiya earn $20 to $200 per firm, twice a year. One firm's general
affairs department chief states that his company's regular policy at one time was
to pay small-time sokaiya ¥ I00,000 (about $800) per year, and to pay its "expert"
sokaiya ¥300,000 to ¥500,000 ($2,400 to $4,000) per month, with bonuses of
¥2 million to ¥3 million ($16,000 to $24,000) around the time of the meeting.
The firm's annual sokaiya budget was ¥500 million (about $4 million) for 2,000
sokaiya, which results in an average payment of $2,000 per sokaiya.
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business 1,000 sokaiya who hold stock in
nearly 12,000 companies.
Some commentators have argued that
sokaiya are a cultural phenomenon, a
reflection of the importance of harmony,
politeness, and respect in Japan. After
extensive research, including numerous
interviews of Japanese managers, attorneys,
prosecutors and sokaiya, I reach a different
conclusion. In this article, I argue that a
better explanation for the behavior of
extortionists and managers in Japan lies in
the choices that are determined by
institutions. Specifically, I argue, first, that
Japanese institutions lead to low levels of
corporate disclosure. Because extortion
correlates positively to secrecy, inadequate
disclosure creates blackmail opportunities
that can be used by sokaiya at any time.
Second, I show empirically that long
shareholders' meetings in Japan send
negative market signals that lead to stock
price drops. Japanese executives pay sokaiya
to avoid these negative returns. Concisely
stated, Japanese firms choose to pay sokaiya
because the Japanese system makes paying
sokaiya less costly than the alternative.

I. A CORPORATE EXTORTION PRIMER
The question of why sokaiya successfully
extort Japanese companies in spite of the
law while sokaiya apparently do not arise in
the United States, even in the absence of
legal prohibitions, principally involves
three factors: sokaiya, corporations, and
corporate law.
A. Sokaiya
Although sokaiya play a variety of roles,
they usually come in one of three varieties.
First, there are fighters. Japanese managers
have long known that one of the easiest
ways to ensure an orderly shareholders'
meeting is to hire thugs to intimidate
shareholders who want to speak. This renta-thug image is fueled by well-publicized
melees of the early 1970s at Chisso
Corporation, where sokaiya physically
suppressed environmental activists, and at
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, where sokaiya
fought to a bloody finish with shareholders
who protested the companys production of
military weapons for the Vietnam War.
Relatively few incidents of physical
shareholder repression have surfaced since
that time, perhaps because sokaiya moved
into other more profitable lines of business,
perhaps because shareholders began to get
the message through more subtle hints
of violence.

Second, a few elite sokaiya are paid to
keep other more dangerous sokaiya away
from meetings. These sokaiya use various
means to accomplish the task: intimidation,
influence peddling, or outright payment.
These sokaiya sometimes become corporate
insiders, advising companies on how to
deal with other troublemakers, how to
organize meetings, and how to circumvent
the law. As one such sokaiya (who prefers
the title "consultant") told me, "Sokaiya
problem? What sokaiya problem? I show
up. I give advice. I help. I do the same thing
that a lawyer would do. And I'm cheaper,
too. Whats the problem with that?"
Finally, and most commonly, many
sokaiya make a living through blackmail.
Sometimes sokaiya blackmail by threatening
to reveal sensitive information at the public
forum of shareholders meetings. Sometimes
the blackmail is not related to meetings at
all. A favorite sokaiya tactic is to request that
a corporation subscribe to magazines
published by the sokaiya; the underlying
threat being that if the company does not
subscribe, scandalous stories about the
company will appear in the magazine.
Other popular tactics include organizing
expensive golf tournaments, leasing potted
plants, and holding karaoke singing
contests. Japanese police arrest
approximately 200 sokaiya (and related
actors) each year on various extortion
charges, but blackmail persists.
Blackmail might flourish in Japan - not
just among sokaiya but in society as a whole
- because of broad legal and social
differences. But this does not seem to be the
case. In a recent study, Judge Richard
Posner found only 124 reported published
opinions (among 3 million in the Westlaw
database) in blackmail cases in the United
States in the last century. I have serious
doubts - as does Posner - about the
reliability of using the number of judicial
opinions as a measure of blackmail activity.
But because good alternatives are scarce,
and a comparison would be nice, I adopt a
similar approach for Japan. I searched for all
blackmail opinions in Hanrei Taikei, a tendisc CD-ROM database that is the Japanese
functional equivalent of Westlaw. After
reading through all the extortion cases
returned by the search, I was only able to
classify 15 of them as informational
blackmail - a small number indeed, and
easily comparable with the U.S. number
given the disparity in database size.

B. The Companies
When confronted by a sokaiya,
companies have two options: pay or resist.
1. Pay. A companys general affairs
department usually handles payments to
sokaiya. Before 1982, many companies had
their affiliated sokaiya form a queue at the
door of that department on the day of, or
the day before, their shareholders' meeting.
All in line received envelopes full of cash.
Recent compensation schemes are more
sophisticated. The 1997 Koike scandal
involved off-the-books loans to a company
owned by Koikes brother (by DKB),
purchases and repurchases of expensive golf
club memberships (Daiwa Securities), and
compensation for losses incurred through
Koikes discretionary "VI.P" account
(Nomura Securities), futures accounts
(Nikko Securities), and Singapore
International Monetary Exchange Nikkei
Index accounts (Yamaichi Securities).
Estimates of how much money
companies actually pay sokaiya vary. One
study finds that typical sokaiya earn $20 to
$200 per firm, twice a year. One firms
general affairs department chief states that
his companys regular policy at one time
was to pay small-time sokaiya ¥100,000
(about $800) per year, and to pay its
"expert" sokaiya ¥300,000 to ¥500,000
($2,400 to $4,000) per month, with
bonuses of ¥2 million to ¥3 million
($16,000 to $24,000) around the time of
the meeting. The firms annual sokaiya
budget was ¥500 million (about $4 million)
for 2,000 sokaiya, which results in an
average payment of $2,000 per sokaiya.
Other evidence comes from the amounts
companies spend on subscriptions to
magazines published by sokaiya. The Koike
scandal brought to light that Nomura
Securities had been paying ¥70 million
($560,000) annually for subscriptions to
700 magazines. Subsequent investigation
revealed that each of Japans large city banks
subscribed to an average of 1,000 such
magazines at a cost of ¥100 million
($800,000) annually.
One way to estimate the amounts
companies pay is to calculate the average
amount cited in court cases. From 1983 to
1998, Japanese courts sentenced executives
from 36 firms who made payments to a
total of 133 sokaiya. The total amount of the
payments to sokaiya by these 36 firms is
¥474.4 million (about $3.8 million),
representing a disbursement of about ¥3.57
million (about $28,000) per sokaiya or
¥13.18 million (about $105,000) per firm.
The highest amount received by a single
sokaiya was ¥94 million ($750,000); the
lowest, ¥50,000 ($400). On one hand,
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Enter the sokaiya.
A skilled sokaiya
can expertly
deconstruct a
balance sheet,
querying
discrepancies,
errors,and
omissions. Though
the same may be
true of analysts in
the United States,
sokaiya have more
secrets to expose
in Japan because
less information is
initially disclosed.
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these figures may understate firms' total
payments because many firms have
relationships with more than one sokaiya.
But on the other hand, these figures may
overstate the payments, as prosecutors may
let smaller payments slide, choosing to
litigate only the large cases.
In short, it is difficult to determine how
much firms pay sokaiya. Many of the
managers I interviewed suggested that one
reason this may be so is that firms pay
sokaiya varying amounts depending on
their relationship wi~h the company; the
quality of their information, the credibility
of their threat, and their skills in
performing other services for the company.
2. Resist. Of course, not all firms pay
sokaiya. Those who do not pay either
(1) are not bothered by sokaiya, (2) tum
threatening sokaiya over to prosecutors,
who pursue them on extortion charges, or
(3) simply ignore sokaiya threats. Although
the third strategy may seem to be the easiest
course, a few executives who ignored
sokaiya threats have become subject to acts
of violence. One survey; conducted by a
National Police Agency administrator,
found 10 acts of violence against corporate
officials during a one-year period alone. At
least three of these incidents - assaults on
executives of Tokai Bank, Fuji Film, and
Sumitomo Bank - are linked to the refusal
of those companies' executives to pay

sokaiya.
C. The Law
Payments to sokaiya to suppress
shareholders' rights have been illegal since
the Commercial Code was promulgated in
1950. Under section 494 of the Code, it is
illegal to make an "improper solicitation"
with respect to the "exercise of shareholder
rights." "Improper solicitation," courts have
held, includes paying sokaiya to prevent
others from "fairly speaking or fairly
exercising their vote."
But this formulation of the law raised
multiple problems of clarity for prosecutors
and civil plaintiffs. These problems, and
growing concerns about corporate gangsters
in an internationalizing Japan, caused the
Japanese legislature in 1981 to enact a fullscale revision of the Commercial Code
aimed specifically at the elimination of
sokaiya. Effective October 1982, prosecutors
need no longer prove an "improper
solicitation." Instead, they need only prove
that a "benefit" was offered with respect to
the exercise of shareholder rights, and in
civil cases, if the benefit is "gratuitously
offered" to a "specific shareholder," it is
presumed that it is offered with respect to
those rights.

The revisions imposed clear civil and
criminal penalties on both sokaiya and
management. The new code also
introduced clear criminal penalties - up to
six months' imprisonment or fines of up to
¥300,000 ($2,400) for both the originator
of the benefit (management) and the
recipient (sokaiya) .
The "sokaiya provisions" of the
Commercial Code create incentives against
payments to sokaiya, and may have
contributed to the decline in the estimated
sokaiya population from about 6,000 pre1982 to about 1,000 in 1997. But the
provisions have at least three readily
apparent problems. First, the six-month
sentence specified by the code carries a
statute of limitations of only three years.
Second, the presumption that a benefit, if
gratuitously offered, is made in connection
with shareholders' rights, only arises if the
payment is made to a shareholder. Third,
the sokaiya provisions do not address the
sokaiya magazine subscription
phenomenon, which can be a significant
sphere of sokaiya activity.
The Japanese judiciary has added an
additional reason why the sokaiya
provisions may not have the full impact
that they otherwise could. In the scores of
cases adjudicated since the sokaiya
provisions took effect, only three sokaiya
(in the Noritake, Ajinomoto, and Mitsubishi
group cases) actually were sentenced to
prison. All others received suspended
sentences. In no case did any of the
executives convicted in those incidents
receive jail time - they all received
suspended sentences. This is not an
aberration from the Japanese criminal
justice system as a whole, which sends
fewer than 5 percent of its suspects to
prison, compared to over 30 percent in the
United States, but it does show that the
sokaiya provisions are not being enforced to
their fullest extent.

II. INFORMATION
Some sokaiya blackmail has nothing to
do with shareholders' meetings. This is
clearly evidenced by year-round sokaiya
magazine subscriptions and implied in
relevant case law. To put it another way,
what would be the expected result if
holding Japanese shareholders' meetings
suddenly were made illegal? After
executives sobered up from the tremendous
parties that they surely would throw in
celebration, sokaiya activity would continue
as usual. Information with blackmail
potential would still be available, and
executives would still be vulnerable. The
sokaiyas' broadcast of information would
simply switch to some other forum.

A. Types of Information
The U.S. corporate governance system
and U.S. corporate law regime, defined
broadly to include regulatory institutions,
makes available more useful information to
independent investors, reducing the
marginal costs to investors of information
acquisition. In contrast, the Japanese system
often keeps such information - most
importantly, negative information - secret.
Sokaiya normally blackmail corporations
with three types of information: financial
and accounting data, potentially scandalous
information relating to corporate
malfeasance, and private information about
management.
1. Financial and Accounting Data. It is
widely recognized that Japanese
corporations do not disclose as much
information as their U.S. counterparts. First,
a Japanese corporation's annual report
contains no mention of management
compensation, as required in the United
States. Second, Japanese reports do not
break down sales by industry or business
line, so it is difficult to determine a firm's
profitability. Third, assets a Japanese firm
holds in the form of securities are booked at
the price at which the firm bought the
shares, not the current market price. Finally,
a Japanese financial statement usually is not
specific about the method the company
uses to depreciate its assets. The aggregate
result is that the annual report, which is
mandatory in both systems, contains
significantly less useful information in Japan
than in the United States.
A recent survey by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) further illustrates the point. The
OECD studied the consolidated financial
statements of several large public
corporations and rated their disclosure of
operating results relative to OECD
guidelines as full or partial. Of 53 U.S. firms
studied, 34 had full disclosure, and 19 had
partial. The 25 British firms in the survey
ranked similarly with 19 full, 6 partial. Of
the 23 Japanese firms surveyed, the results
were nearly opposite: only 2 firms had full
disclosure, while 21 firms had partial
disclosure. A similar survey by the Investor
Responsibility Research Center found that
on average, Japanese listed corporations
were required by law to disclose only 40
percent of the information that is required
in the United States.
Enter the sokaiya. A skilled sokaiya can
expertly deconstruct a balance sheet,
querying discrepancies, errors, and
omissions. Though the same may be true

of analysts in the United States, sokaiya
have more secrets to expose in Japan
because less information is initially
disclosed.
2. Past Bad Acts. More often, sokaiya use
information regarding past corporate
misdeeds to blackmail corporate executives.
Sometimes the acts are illegal; sometimes
they are merely embarrassing. A list of bad
acts that sokaiya typically use for blackmail
would include silently settled product
liability claims, hiring and employment
issues, bid-rigging, poor management
practices, and other unreported liabilities.
It is difficult to determine whether
Japanese firms on average commit more
"bad acts" than U.S. firms or if more bad
acts simply are kept secret. If the former is
true, it is probably because Japanese
overregulation creates incentives for firms to
commit bad acts. An obvious case is that of
now-defunct Yamaichi Securities. Yamaichi
competed in what is perhaps the most
heavily regulated sector of the Japanese
economy: the securities industry. Unlike the
United States, where brokerage fees were
deregulated in 1975, commissions on
securities transactions in Japan remained
fixed until 1998. In order to maintain the
accounts of its largest customers, Yamaichi
agreed to perform "tobashi" transactions,
the illegal practice of repurchasing losses
that have been shifted so that favored
customers do not have to report losses.
Sokaiya learned of the arrangement and
used it to blackmail Yamaichi.
3. Personal Information. Sometimes the
information that sokaiya use to blackmail
companies is purely personal in nature an executive's extramarital affair, a director's
criminal son, a manager's questionable
background - all make excellent blackmail
fodder and payments are usually made by
the corporation, not the individual.
B. Information Concealment:

The Role of Government and Governance
What elements would a regime need to
facilitate the non-disclosure of negative
information? First, it would need an
organizational system that would tend to
prevent negative information from being
unwillingly released. Second, it would
require minimal enforcement of disclosure
requirements so that firms would (a) not
get caught keeping secrets and (b) if caught,
would not be too severely punished. Third,
it would need some mechanism through
which economy-wide (or at least industrywide) unraveling effects could be deterred.
In Japan, firms appear to benefit from all
three elements.
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1. Maintaining Secrecy. Three aspects of
the Japanese corporate governance system
help to maintain secrecy better than in the
United States. First, the cross-shareholding
(keiretsu) system common in the Japanese
economy lessens the need for market-wide
disclosure. If a small number of institutional
shareholders hold a large percentage of a
company's stock, there is lessened incentive
to share information outside of that
limited group.
Second, most large Japanese firms are
affiliated with a main bank. Main banks are
in some ways similar to non-financial crossshareholders because their inside position
reduces the need for public disclosure.
Finally, Japanese boards of directors are
composed almost exclusively of insiders.
The lack of outside directors may result in a
reduced flow of information to sources
outside the firm.
2. Enforcement. The Japanese disclosure
regime is characterized by a lack of
enforcement of disclosure laws by civil or
criminal means relative to the level of
enforcement in the United States. The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission
investigates an average of 150 to 200 cases
annually. By contrast, from 1992 to 1995,
the Japanese Securities and Exchange
Surveillance Commission (SESC)
investigated only six.
Virtually no securities fraud litigation,
civil or criminal, occurs in Japan. Japan has
no class action mechanism. Another
potential enforcement mechanism, the
shareholder derivative suit, has only
recently become active, as a result of a 1993
Commercial Code amendment that made
the mechanism moderately more accessible.
However, because of reliance on the
business judgment rule, in cases involving
listed companies, the only shareholders
who have litigated successfully have been
those whose directors committed illegal
acts. Japan's judge-centered civil law
discovery system also may yield less
corporate information than the U.S.
adversary system.
3. Deterring Disclosure. Even in the
absence of mandatory disclosure provisions,
competitive markets should still produce
something close to the right level of
information to investors. Firms with
positive outlooks have every reason to
disclose their rosy futures. Those firms with
the next most favorable information then
disclose, and the unraveling process
continues until all firms disclose except for
those firms. with the worst information. At
this point, investors can draw inferences
about those firms' financial outlook from
their silence. In Japan, this "unraveling
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effect" appears not to occur as frequently or
as deeply as it does in the United States.
The broad range of Japanese corporate
secrets may limit unraveling as investors
cannot be sure what type of information to
seek. Some deterrence to the unraveling
effect probably also results from direct
coordination among managers of
"competitive" firms.
But most importantly, corporate Japan
may have mitigated the unraveling effect by
relying on an institution - the bureaucracy
- to monitor firms and keep disclosure at
preset levels, in effect creating an
"information cartel." Although bureaucratic
influence may come from a variety of
different sources, I focus in particular on
the most prominent ministry (particularly
in recent sokaiya scandals), the Ministry of
Finance (MOF). MOF serves as regulator,
protector, and promoter of the financial
services industry and securities markets. In
many cases, MOF chooses protection and
promotion over regulation. Examples
abound; two recent events from January
1998 tend to confirm what had always been
widely suspected:
• Two MOF financial inspectors were
arrested on charges that they took
bribes from Sumitomo Bank, TokyoMitsubishi Bank, Sanwa Bank, DaiIchi Kangyo Bank, Asahi Bank, and
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in return
for revealing inspection plans to the
"MOF-tan" (a manager in charge of
MOF relations) at those banks.
During and after a subsequent
investigation, a senior investigator
committed suicide, the minister and
vice-minister were forced to resign,
and 112 officials were disciplined for
"excessive" wining and dining.
• Koichi Miyakawa, a former MOF
financial inspector, admitted to
prosecutors that he learned of illegal
loans by Dai-lchi Kangyo Bank to
sokaiya Ryuichi Koike in 1994 and
deleted information regarding those
loans from his official report.
The reasons why MOF might withhold
information are plentiful, and suggest that
the incidents recounted above are not mere
aberrations. Sometimes the goal may be
market stability. Sometimes MOF may
withhold information in order to prevent
firms from failing - a goal that can be
observed in the United States in cases like
the 1979 Chrysler Corporation rescue or
the 1998 Long-Term Capital bailout - but
that is supported more openly and invoked
more frequently in Japan. Private interest,
rather than public policy, is also likely;
recent scandals suggest that bribery, at least

in the form of lavish entertainment, if not
cash, may be widespread. Even if outright
bribery is limited to a few high-profile cases
(which, unfortunately, appears not to be the
case), it is no secret that bureaucrats' careers
are determined by legislators, who receive
large contributions from large corporations.
Also a potential contributing factor is the
practice of amakudari, through which
former bureaucrats, especially in heavily
regulated industries, retire to high-paying
positions in the very ,companies that they
formerly monitored, supported, and
promoted.
The case is easy to overstate; I do not
intend to imply that MOF or any other
agency purposely limits disclosure as a
matter of policy (though they might). But
through small steps and individual actions,
MOF and other agencies can be effectively
employed as institutional solutions to
collective action problems, ensuring that
"excessive" disclosure does not occur, and
allowing all firms to profit while
maintaining minimum disclosure policies.

C. Information Acquisition:

Organized Crime Syndicates
A blackmail threat is only credible if the
blackmailer has sensitive information and
the means to expose it. Sokaiya are often
able to acquire both by means of
relationships to the yakuza or boryukuden
(Japan's organized crime syndicates) and
related groups.
Yakuza are more numerous and more
pervasive in everyday Japanese life than
their Mafia counterparts in the United
States. The general explanation for this in
the socioeconomic literature is that Japan's
overregulated economy, layered bureaucracy,
and slow-moving court system create an
environment in which it is often quicker
and easier for corporations, individuals, and
occasionally government itself, to tum to
the yakuza than to legitimate organizations.
In the corporate context, firms tum to
sokaiya to handle activities that they either
are not equipped to handle or are not
willing to undertake directly. Companies
can hire yakuza to enforce judgments, a
skill at which gangs appear to be more
adept than the legal system. Construction
firms reportedly use yakuza to monitor bid
rigging for public works projects. Such
firms also tum to yakuza to bypass strict
immigration laws so that Southeast Asian
immigrants can be used on construction
projects. For securities firms, one common
use of yakuza is said to be in the
manipulation of stock prices, especially in
the ramping of prices for new issues. For
real estate firms, yakuza can be used to

intimidate stubborn holdout owners into
vacating land at a low price, a niche created
at least in part by Japanese landlord-tenant
law, which heavily favors tenants. For
lenders, sokaiya can assist with debt
collection or may even purchase bad debts
so that banks do not have to write them off
(yakuza can then make the debtors offers
that cannot be refused).
The problem for the corporation is that
once it turns to the yakuza for private law
enforcement, the yakuza, via sokaiya, can
then use information gathered in
performing the services to blackmail the
company. And the company knows that the
yakuzalsokaiya can follow through on the
threat of exposure - after all, it is the
yakuza'.s expertise in such matters that leads
corporations to tum to them in the first
place.
The foregoing is not meant to suggest
that all firms hire yakuza to do their dirty
work The degree of involvement varies by
industry, and it is doubtful that every firm
in any industry would tum to the
underground. These services are more
available in Japan, and because of their
sheer numbers, most firms - or at least
vulnerable secret-holding employees of
those firms - are likely to encounter
organized crime representatives.
Mob ties help sokaiya in other ways.
First, and perhaps obviously, yakuza can
impose occasional threats of physical
violence when necessary. Second, mob ties
also help sokaiya maintain their monopoly
over information that has blackmail
potential.
As noted earlier, not all sokaiya are
involved in blackmail. Some fill important
roles of silencing dissenters, whether they
are shareholders or other sokaiya. In this
sense, yakuza/sokaiya are classic racketeers,
mixing extortion with enforcement of illegal
monopolies. Many yakuza/sokaiya, rather
than working against the company, simply
reinforce existing collusion between
managers and large shareholders, providing
services for which many managers pay
Nor do all sokaiya have organized crime
connections. A small group of sokaiya
intelligentsia makes its living blackmailing
corporations with information derived from
standard securities analyses of firms'
financial statements and other public
documents. This group, which even
includes a couple of corporate law
professors, makes money more on
analytical acumen than mob ties. Their
tactics are more subtle, as they often send
their written findings to the corporations,
with attached cover letters suggesting that

Firms with positive outlooks have every
reason to disclose their rosy futures.
Those firms with the next most
favorable information then disclose, and
the unraveling process continues until
all firms disclose except for those firms
with the worst information. At this
point, investors can draw inferences
about those firms' financial outlook
from their silence. In Japan, this
"unraveling effect" appears not to
occur as frequently or as deeply as it
does in the United States.
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perhaps the companies might wish to
purchase the information in lieu of more
widespread publication.
D. Infonnation, Reputation,

and Regulation
Sokaiya choose their targets knowing
that Japanese corporate secrecy has a dual
effect. First, the lack of publicly available
information in Japan means that the secrets
that sokaiya can unearth have more
blackmail potential than more public
"secrets" of the United States. Second, the
non-availability of information means that
the release of such information poses a
greater threat to the Japanese corporation
than to its U.S. counterpart, as investors in
Japanese markets should be more likely to
attach meaning to relatively immaterial
information than they would in U.S.
markets.
This analysis implies that sokaiya will
target firms with specific characteristics. A
list of firms that pay sokaiya should be
composed largely of (1) firms with secrets
and (2) firms to whom the release of
information would be the most damaging.
Of course there is no such list. But a
substitute does exist - a list of firms
implicated in sokaiya payment scandals.
Since 1982, executives of 36
companies have been
sentenced for sokaiya
payments (a 100
percent conviction
rate). Executives
of one other
firm (Nomara
Securities)
have been
arrested and
pleaded
guilty and
agreed to pay
more than $3

firms, seven, or
nearly 20 percent,
are very large food,
convenience, and
department stores. Another
11, or almost 30 percent, are
financial institutions. Combined, these
two industry categories account for 18 of
the 3 7 - roughly half - of sokaiya arrest
incidents. The same industry categories
account for only 13 percent of Tokyo Stock
Exchange firms, and for an even smaller
percentage of all public Japanese firms.
This industry breakdown shows that
reputation plays an important role in
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determining which firms tend to pay

sokaiya. Game theory shows that "the power
of reputation seems to be positively related
to its fragility" Firms whose reputations are
most easily shattered will value reputation
more highly than other firms will. The
applicability to financial institutions is clear;
they operate in a highly competitive
industry in which public trust is essential to
success. Department stores in Japan
function under similar constraints. Japanese
department stores sell food, a commodity in
which trust is essential. Moreover, the
margins in retail in Japan, and especially in
food retail, are comparatively very thin, and
the market is quite competitive: In Japan,
there are 120 retailers and 46 food retailers
per 10,000 persons; in the United States the
corresponding numbers are 59 and 7 per
10,000. This thin-margin environment in
which multiple competitors are often selling
identical products may lead some Japanese
department stores to value their reputation
more highly than corresponding U.S. firms.
The degree to which industry is
regulated also seems to determine sokaiya
targets. MOF plays a predominant role in
the financial services industry. In the retail
industry, the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) is in charge, heavily
regulating retail stores with inefficient
requirements relating to floor space,
vacation days (a minimum of 24 days per
year), and even requiring local merchant
consent to the creation of new large stores.
Heavy regulation may lead to questionable
practices, the knowledge of which can be
used for subsequent blackmail, or it may be
a conduit for deterring the informational
unraveling effect.
E. Uses for Negative Infonnation,

or Why Don't They Just ... ?
Why do sokaiya choose to blackmail
executives with negative information as
opposed to using it to profit in some legal
manner? While extortion-like uses for
negative information can arise in all
systems, institutions determine the form of
the extortion. In the United States, three
potential uses for negative information securities lawsuits, financial instruments,
and publication - are readily apparent. In
Japan, however, these sources of profit are
much more limited, and holders of negative
information thus tum to extortion, whether
as sokaiya or by selling information to

sokaiya.
1. La.wsuits. Negative information in the
United States is often used for profit by
securities plaintiffs, or more specifically, by
their attorneys. In the United States, as a
congressional committee noted, securities

class litigation is "lawyer-driven" and often
carried out by "professional plaintiffs" who
own nominal interests in many different
companies and who stand willing to lend
their names to class actions in exchange for
an extra "bounty" payment upon
settlement. In such a system, nominal
professional plaintiffs perform the same
economic function as sokaiya: They simply
exercise their claim legally after disclosure ,
while sokaiya make their claim illegally
before the information can be disclosed.
In Japan, the class action system does
not exist. The Japanese derivative suit
mechanism creates little monetary incentive
either for shareholders or their attorneys.
Without a legal mechanism through which
to profit from negative information, an
illegal one emerged.
2. Financial instruments. Investors can
profit on undisclosed negative information
by the use of financial instruments such as
put options or short sales. But due to heavy
regulation, options and short sales are more
difficult, more costly, and much less
popular in Japan than in the United States.
Regulation aside, in the Japanese system,
sokaiya blackmail has at least three
advantages over trading. First, income
earned from either short sales or options is
a one-shot affair, while income earned from
blackmail can be repeated at least once a
year with continued threats of exposure. Of
course, blackmail and trading are not
mutually exclusive. A sokaiya could
blackmail the company, short the stock,
announce the information, and reap a dual
profit - but then he would be unable to
reap future profits using either method.
Second, sokaiya blackmail may be less
risky. A holder of a short position or a put
option has no way of determining whether,
when, or to what extent market prices will
actually fall. Short-sellers face additional
risks. "Uptick" rules that prohibit short sales
in a falling market prevent sokaiya from
shorting after the release of the information.
If multiple sokaiya attempt to short-sell,
purchases required to cover their repayment
obligations can actually drive prices up.
Blackmail, on the other hand, involves
almost certain payment, and the risk of
arrest is minimal.
Finally, in a market of low informational
availability, many companies may actually
prefer blackmail to the use of financial
instruments. Shorting is a viable investment
strategy only if negative information is to be
released. Companies have no desire to see
negative information released. Accordingly,
some should be willing to pay potential
short-selling sokaiya significant sums not to
short.

3. Publication. When cooperation leads
to efficiency gains that the market fails to
capture, "private order" economic
institutions will emerge. Perhaps the
cooperation of sokaiya with managers
constitutes such a "private order"
institution. But if there is so much valuable
negative information out there, why don't
securities agencies, newspapers, or some
other third party profit from it legally by
selling it to investors?
Part of the answer may lie in the players
in the game. The most likely distributors of
the information would be securities houses
and their affiliated research groups. These
groups may not always have the proper
incentives to research and convey to
customer's negative information. Japanese
securities firms traditionally earn the bulk
of their profits through commissions rather
than from trading on their own accounts.
Accordingly, their goal is to influence
customers to buy more securities and pay
more commissions. Moreover, as recent
scandals have shown, the securities houses
themselves are often so deeply mired in
sokaiya activity that pointing out the
mistakes of others could simply be a
suicide request.
The media may constitute another
source of negative information
distributorship. But the Japanese media has
long been known for its press club that
rewards positive publicity for the news
source over expose reporting. Moreover,
many Japanese media with enough capital
to publish news of hidden corporate
wrongdoing are often owned and affiliated
substantially with the very large
corporations on whom they would be
reporting.
This leaves one particular group of
actors with enough capital and consumer
trust to fill the gap - foreign securities
firms. Although foreign firms have been in
Japan since 1961 , their activity was
relatively limited until the bubble economy
that began in the mid-1980s. As new
entrants to the market, establishing a
reputation among Japanese securities
customers was relatively difficult, and such
firms were forced to be much more active
in trading for their own accounts than their
Japanese counterparts, who could rely on
churning alone. But as foreign firms lured
foreign customers to Japanese markets, and
developed reputations in Japanese domestic
markets, that picture began to change, and
now the top four foreign firms conduct
more retail trading than do the Japanese
top four.
These foreign firms already may have
affected sokaiya activity. The decline in

sokaiya from 6,000 pre-1982 to about
1,000 in 1997 is often cited as a result of
enforcement of the 1982 sokaiya provisions.
But very little actually changed in 1982 sokaiya activity was illegal before 1982, and
a handful of arrests in the following years
does not amount to rigorous enforcement.
A better explanation for the decline of
sokaiya may be the relatively unbiased
dissemination of information by foreign
firms in Japan. With fewer ties to listed
firms and an initial reliance on trading
wholesale rather than retail for profit,
' foreign firms are often said to be less
reluctant to distribute (true) negative
information about listed firms. Foreign
firms can make legitimate use of negative
information on which sokaiya would
otherwise profit. As the foreign retail
presence increases, their distribution of
negative information to investors may
further drive sokaiya out of business.
F. A Brief Comparative Test

If institutions determine how negative
information is used, we would expect to see
sokaiya-like actors in similar institutional
environments. As it turns out, sokaiya-like
actors are not unique to Japan. In South
Korea, chongheoggun are "hecklers" who
demand money from companies in
exchange for pro-management services or
speeches during shareholders meetings.
Although not identical, the similarity
between Japanese and Korean institutions
and organizations is more than cosmetic.
Korean firms are arguably even more
heavily regulated than Japanese firms.
Korean chaebol look a lot like Japanese
keiretsu and other cross-shareholding
arrangements, and chaebol is written with
the same Chinese characters used in
Japanese for zaibatsu, Japan's pre-war
conglomerates. Similar institutions lead to
similar results.
It could be that sokaiya simply plague
Asian systems. But how, then, could Italian
"disturbato1i" be explained? Disturbatori are,
as the International Herald Tlibune has
reported, "professional claques that get paid
under the table not to disrupt a company's
annual shareholders' meeting" - in other
words, Italian sokaiya. Italy has no labels
like keiretsu or chaebol for its corporate
system, but its largest organizations are
structured in the form of pyramidal groups
of financial and operational firms . As in
Japan and Korea, the state plays an
inordinate role in corporate governance,
and corruption scandals occur with some
regularity. The Mafia parallel to yakuza is
inescapable.
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Ill. FILIBUSTER BLACKMAIL
Shareholders' meetings seem to play a
critical role in the sokaiya framework.
Magazine subscriptions aside, most of the
payments to sokaiya come just before a
firms shareholders' meeting. And sokaiyas'
use of shitsumonjo - a written list of
expository questions to be raised at the
meeting that sokaiya submit to management
to induce payment - also underscores
meeting importance.
Two reasons explain the annual
concentration of sokaiya payments. First, if
management had to pay sokaiya year-round,
accounting would be more difficult, and the
risk of detection would increase. Second,
annual payments are a mechanism by
which the sokaiya can precommit to limited
extortion. The sokaiyas implicit message to
the firm is "pay me this one time and you
won't see me again until next year."
Why shareholders' meetings7 Don't
firms know that in most cases, a
shareholders' meeting is nothing but, as
A.A. Berle Jr. aptly described it in Economic
Power and the Free Society (1957), "a kind of
ancient, meaningless ritual like some of the
ceremonies that go on with the mace in the
House of Lords?" Why do managers pay
sokaiya to keep their meetings short and
quiet? Who cares if a "meaningless ritual" of
a meeting runs long?
A. The Role of Shareholders' Meetings
In both Japan and the United States,
shareholders' meetings are usually
meaningless rituals that have all the
entertainment value of watching wet paint
dry. In Japan, however, meetings take on
heightened significance. Almost all Japanese
corporations hold their shareholders'
meetings on a designated "meeting day" in
June . In 1998, 2,325 firms, including
95 percent of all firms listed on the first
section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, held
their meetings on "meeting day."
Meeting time in Japan is all-important.
The top story of the evening news on
meeting day is usually the length of large
firms' meetings. After their meetings, each
of Japans large commercial banks must call
the Banking Department of MOF to report
its meeting time. As the manager of one of
those banks' general affairs departments
told me, "This really puts us in a bind. If
our meeting is too short, MOF thinks its
because we're paying sokaiya. If its too long,
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they say, 'Whats wrong? You got bad loans
outstanding or something?'" As a
consequence, most firms try to hit the
magic number of 30 minutes for their
meetings - and most succeed. In 1997,
average meeting length on meeting day was
29 minutes, over 95 percent of meetings
ended in less than an hour, and no
questions were asked at 87.5 percent
of meetings.
Companies employ a variety of strategies
to keep meetings short. Some, of course,
pay sokaiya. This tactic seems to work;
firms that pay sokaiya tend to have short,
orderly shareholders' meetings, while those
that do not pay have long ones. Three
recent stories illustrate the point. First,
Sony, often held to be a model of good
corporate governance practices in Japan,
publicly announced in 1983 that to comply
with the new sokaiya provisions, it
unequivocally would have no further
relations with sokaiya. Sokaiya responded by
questioning Sony executives for over
13 hours at its 1984 meeting. The market
responded negatively, "chilling" a twomonth rise in Sonys stock price. Second, in
contrast, Nomura Securities' most
potentially volatile meeting was its 1995
gathering, in which it (1) announced a
record $500 million loss and (2) reinstated
as directors its former chairman and
president, who had resigned four years
earlier to take responsibility for sokaiya and
loss compensation scandals. Nomura paid
sokaiya Ryuichi Koike for his silence at the
firms 1995 meeting. The meeting lasted
half an hour. Finally, department store
Matsuzakayas 1994 and 1995 meetings
lasted 4 hours and 3 hours, respectively.
Matsuzakaya executives began paying
sokaiya in 1996. Its 1996 meeting lasted 19
minutes; its 1997 meeting, 38 minutes.
Executives in any country would prefer
short meetings to long ones - even
General Motors has measures in place to
keep its meeting short, and almost all firms
have policies to control unruly parties.
B. An Empirical Test
I hypothesize that if long meetings are
more damaging than short meetings, on
average, firms that have long meetings will
have significantly negative stock returns.
To test the hypothesis, I use the following
method. A publication named Shiryoban
Shoji Homu (loosely, Corporate Data Book)
publishes an accurate list of the length of
the shareholders' meetings of virtually every
largeJapanese firm-1,927 firms in 1997,
and a total of 12,301 observations for the
period 1990-97. From these lists, I
constructed a dataset of all long meetings

held on meeting day (when 95 percent of
firms hold their annual meetings) by firstsection Tokyo stock exchange firms during
the eight-year period from 1990 to 1997. I
define "long" as one hour or longer. My
review of the Shiryoban Shoko Homu data
yielded 285 such long meetings. Of the
firms that held these 285 meetings, all but
five had complete stock price data in the
Datastream electronic database, yielding a
total of 280 observations. I then used
financial economics methodology to
conduct an event stucly designed to test the
price effects on the firms' stock in the year
of their long meeting for the two-day period
beginning the day of the meeting.
The results were as follows. The average
market adjusted returns for the entire
sample of 280 firms with meetings of over
one hour were relatively unexciting; they
showed a statistically insignificant decline of
.06 percent. Perhaps investors only care if a
firm has an extraordinarily long meeting. To
test this hypothesis, I split the 280 firms
that had long meetings into two groups;
those whose meetings lasted from one to
two hours, and those whose meetings
exceeded two hours. Again results were not
very exciting and most were not statistically
significant.
Finally, I split the sample into two
groups: repeaters and non-repeaters. I
define "repeater" as those firms in the
dataset of long meetings whose meetings in
the year previous preceding their long
meeting also exceeded one hour. All other
firms are non-repeaters. The reasoning
behind this division is that if a firm
regularly has long meetings, investors
eventually learn that there is no information
being signaled by the length of the firms
meeting. Electrical utilities, for instance,
almost always have very long meetings;
they were the only repeater firms in 1991,
1992, and 1994 to have meetings longer
than two hours. But these meetings run
long because of anti-nuclear protests, not
sokaiya. And some meetings of Japanese
firms with good investor relations programs
run long for the same planned reasons that
they might in the United States: speeches,
entertainment, and hors d'oeuvres. Realizing
this, the market should not react to the
length of repeaters' meetings.
In fact, in my study, repeaters on average
showed a slight, though insigificant increase
in market adjusted returns during the
meeting day window. The surprising story
in my experiment was the set of firms that
have long meetings out of the blue; that is,
the non repeaters. In the year of their long

meetings, these firms, on average, had
statistically significant market-adjusted
returns of -0.59 percent. Stated concretely,
the data show that during the period
1990-97, if a company that did not
regularly have long meetings suddenly had
a long meeting, that company lost, on
average, 0.59 percent of its value (adjusted
for market risk and variation in the Tokyo
Stock Price Index) during the two-day
period beginning the day it held its
meeting.
Faced with these stock price effects, how
might each actor - managers, sokaiya, and
shareholders - behave? Managers have
incentives to pay sokaiya to keep meetings
short, whether the payments are made to
keep sokaiya quiet at meetings or as
compensation for sokaiya suppression of
"legitimate" shareholder voice. Sokaiya
clearly have incentives to disrupt meetings,
and given negative returns for long
meetings, it may not be necessary that all of
their information is always true or even
always secret, so long as they can make the
meeting run long and collect enough true
information over time to maintain the
signals validity: Finally and somewhat
perversely, investors should in some cases
welcome payments to sokaiya, as sokaiya,
for a relatively trivial fee, can prevent an
average loss in shareholder wealth of
0.59 percent.
Investors thus tend to buy the stock only
of those companies that have short
meetings. Of course, this pleases companies
that usually have short meetings. But some
companies - presumably those with such
low information disclosure that
shareholders can only acquire relevant
information by asking lengthy questions at
shareholders' meetings - will tend to have
long meetings. These companies have clear
incentives to pool with (mimic) companies
that have short meetings. Paying sokaiya
helps them do so.

CONCLUSION
Why would rational executives of highly
successful Japanese firms pay sokaiya
racketeers to keep their shareholders'
meetings short? This article has shown that
sometimes they pay sokaiya for blackmail,
which is hardly a uniquely Japanese
phenomenon. But sometimes the blackmail
actually does center around shareholders'
meetings. The econometric data I have
gathered suggest that because meeting
length is correlated to share prices,
payments to sokaiya to keep meetings short
can increase shareholder wealth.
This wealth maximization potential is a
direct product of Japanese corporate law,

regulation, and corporate governance,
which facilitate barren information markets.
Sokaiya - often armed with mob
connections that make their threats
perfectly clear - simply take advantage of
the fact that little information is
disseminated. U .5. corporate blackmail
apparently does not reach the scale of that
of Japan because the U .5. federal system,
relatively unfettered by inefficient corporate
law, heavy regulation, and other anticompetitive institutions, makes publicly
available more information with blackmail
potential.
The sokaiya payment institution persists
because, given other existing institutions,
almost all actors have reason to choose it
over alternative choices. Obviously sokaiya
can profit with little chance of detection.
Managers and shareholders benefit, too.
The Japanese press sometimes describes
sokaiya-paying managers as gutless and
cowardly: Managers counterattack with cries
that they bravely pay sokaiya "for the good
of the company:" On this issue, managerial
and shareholder interests are aligned. Given
that the system is one of non-disclosure,
shareholders (and perhaps society as a
whole) may derive further benefit from
sokaiya activity, as sokaiya may serve as
monitors of management behavior, forcing
managers to calculate the cost of sokaiya
bribes into the cost of their actions. And if
MOF wants to prevent firms from failing, it,
too, may have incentives to support sokaiya
activity:
The institutional incentive structure
implies that recent Japanese legislative
efforts to curtail sokaiya activity may be of
limited efficacy. In November 1997, the
Japanese legislature enacted revisions to the
Commercial Code designed (once again) to
eliminate sokaiya. The new provisions
increase criminal penalties for payment
from imprisonment of 6 months or a
$2,400 fine to 3 years and $24,000; impose
criminal liability for sokaiya who demand
payment (as opposed to liability only for
receiving payment); and increase penalties
for related wrongdoing such as money
laundering and making false statements to
regulators. This legislation may have some
marginal effect. But even after the law which ignores the institutional dynamics
discussed in this article - was enacted
(and several months after the most
publicized scandals), 60 percent of

surveyed directors, 79 percent of auditors,
and 75 percent of managers still said that
they would be unable to cut sokaiya ties in
10 years.
Despite these recent legislative attempts
at reform, sokaiya influence remains
pervasive. On a recent and utterly
unscientific walk around Tokyo'.s Kabutocho
securities brokerage district, I saw three
types of freshly-inked posters in brokerage
windows. Eight firms' posters warned
sokaiya and other unsavqry types to stay
away. Four firms' posters apologized for
their recent sokaiya scandals. Three firms
had posters announcing the dissolution of
the firm. Breadwinning calligraphers and
poster-printers can take comfort. Unless
and until the incentive structures created by
corporate law, corporate governance, and
regulatory policy change to encourage more
"stay away" signs, demand for sokaiya
apology signs, and perhaps dissolution
signs as well, is likely to persist.
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